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SINGLE SALES AS VIOLATION OF LIQUOR
INJUNCTION
LELAND STANFORD FORREST*
That a single sale of liquor without other circumstances does not
amount to a nuisance is not new as a matter of law,1 but a recent
holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,2 that
a single sale is not a contempt of an injunction not to sell liquor, is
of interest because it intimates an underlying limitation upon the
Volstead law and foreshadows a termination of certain practices that
have prevailed in the prosecution of liquor-law violators.
There is a dissenting opinion urging that in view of the words of
the injunction such is a contempt. But as both opinions intimated
unconstitutionality of phases of the Volstead law, the writer feels that
the situation presented by the facts reveals a subconscious view upon
the part of the court that the basis of the decision is depriving a
defendant of a jury trial, rather than that the defendant's conduct
was not a nuisance. The facts of the case suggest themselves as an
opportunity for a reconciliation of what is said by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co.,3 and
the rule announced in Mugler v. Kansas.
4
Ever since the latter case it has been assumed in both state and
federal courts that a court of equity has the power to punish for con-
tempt without a jury trial, as preceedings by the common law for
contempt of court were never tried by jury.5 The question presented
is whether one who is accused of an alleged contempt which is com-
mitted not in the presence of the court is entitled to a jury trial.6
This seems to have been settled for the federal courts in the Mugler
case, 7 supra, as well as in Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County,8 in the
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Schechter v. U. S. (1925) 7 F (2nd) 881; Hermansky v. U. S. (1925) 7
F. (2nd) 458.
Webb. v. U. S. (1926) 14 F. (2nd) 574.
'Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co. (1910) 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. Ed. 797.
' Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623.
'One of the attributes of a court of justice is that it should have the
power of vindicating its dignity without calling upon a jury to assist it in
the exercise of this power.
'This comment is confined to the class of contempts not committed in the
presence of the court.
"Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623.
'Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County (1889) 134 U. S. 31.
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negative. Such is due process of law as contemplated by the 14th
Amendment, and, in a proper case, not criminal as contemplated by
the 5th Amendment. If it were not for what the court has said in
the Gompers case the intimation in the opinion of Webb v. United
States9 would seem startling in view of the previous decisions fol-
lowing the Mugier case.
The instant case is this: Two and one-half years previously the
defendant has been found to be maintaining a liquor nuisance as
defined in Section 21 of the Volstead Act, on described premises, and
the court, following the power recited in Section 22 (Federal Statutes
Anno. 1919 Supp. 212) ordered that no liquor should be manufac-
tured, sold, bartered or stored on the premises, and the premises were,
by order of court, "padlocked" for a year. Some two years there-
after a waiter of defendant made a single sale of liquor on the
premises and such was the contempt defendant was cited for. There
was no proof of other circumstances indicating an intention to con-
tinue selling liquor. The majority of the court held (1) that the
injunction was not perpetual and that the nuisance which the court
ordered abated had been wiped out long before this sale and the
decree of the court wholly executed, and (2) even if the order was
still in force, the court, by fashioning the injunction after the lan-
guage in Section 22, exceeded the intention of Congress, the only
power conferred being to suppress the nuisance. That is to say, that
Section 22 means that the court can enjoin sales, etc., which tend to
continue the nuisance, as distinguished from enjoining the sale of
liquor.
Faris, J., dissented upon both propositions. A search of the
authorities throws no special light upon the first proposition. While
in some states injunctions granted under similar statutes are held to
be permanent, such a result follows because the statute so states or
the wording thereof makes the intention of the legislature clear.1 0
As far we can discover, the courts have not directly construed this
particular statute and it seems that it is open to either construction as
a matter of principle; and thus the first point is one merely of infor-
mational interest.
The second proposition is the one that at first seems startling and
deserves the attention of those interested in the power of courts of
* Webb v. U. S. (1926) 14 F. (2nd) 574.
"°State v. Durien (1891) 46 Kans. 695, 27 Pac. 148; Dickinson v. Eichorn
(1889) 78 Iowa, 710, 43 N. W. 620.
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equity. While the prevailing opinion proposes to determine the
intention of Congress, since the reason for selecting a particular inten-
tion is that the other alternative would be unconstitutional, the deci-
sion reduced to its last analysis is either of two things: (1) A legis-
lative body cannot confer upon a court of equity, where a nuisance
exists, power to enjoin single acts which collectively make up the
nuisance, as distinguished from the inherent equity power to enjoin
or abate the nuisance; or (2) if equity does so order, the power to
enforce that decree does not exist in equity where there has been only
a single violation of the decree.
1. Concerning the first analysis, investigation reveals little
authority. Cases which declare the power not to exist are distin-
guishable in that the legislation involved taking property without due
process of law.' There is dictum sustaining the power,' 2 although
such power is questioned in United States v. Cohen.'3 But if one has
built so close to the house of another that the snow collects upon his
roof and slides upon the other's premises, the court will not only
enjoin the wrong of allowing snow to slide, but will order snow
guards built.' 4 So, a liquor nuisance existing, because Congress
declared it to be such (section 21), equity has power to enjoin or
abate the nuisance because of its inherent power, and, to get federal
jurisdiction, Congress declared this power in section 22; but if Con-
gress intended to say that the court should go beyond this power and
grant an order restraining a single act not commensurate with the
wrong complained of, was that authorizing equity to exceed an equity
function? The above cases by analogy would seem to justify it, since
equity jurisdiction as distinguished from law is a matter of policy
rather than of power. Is it not the same thing as saying that Con-
gress did not intend to encourage equity to engage in this additional
remedy, because to do so would violate some rights guaranteed a
defendant by the Constitution?
In the Florida case'r where the legislature gave jurisdiction to
equity which the Supreme Court of that state thought it did not
previously have, it was not extended to awarding damages for the
wrong already done, "since the defendant is entitled to a jury trial
" City of Janesville v. Carpenter (1890) 77 Wis. 288, 46 N. W. 128, 8 L.
R. A. 808.
' Cowan v. Skinner (1906) 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 730.
" U.. S. v. Cohen (1920) 268 Fed. 420.
1, Hollenbeck v. St. Mark's Lutheran Church (1912) 138 N. Y. Supp. 1063.
16 Cowan v. Skinner (1906) 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 730.
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on the question of damages according to the course of the common
law where they can not be ascertained and awarded as incidents to
equitable relief upon established equitable grounds independent of
the statute." Thus, even if the legislature did say that in case a
nuisance existed, individual acts short of the whole nuisance could
be enjoined, where a single act is enjoined, the doing of that act in
violation completes the contempt and any further procedure upon the
part of the court is punishment, and as such calls for a criminal pro-
ceeding with all of its constitutional guarantees.
2. The second analysis provides a more satisfactory principle
upon which the decision may be explained, namely, that even though
the court may enjoin a single act where it has taken jurisdiction for
some other reason, it may violate a constitutional right of defendant
if it tries to enforce its decree by the usual equity procedure, of sum-
mary punishment. What was said in previous cases (Mugler v.
Kansas) to be an inherent power of the court of equity to punish for
contempt was intended to apply to enforcing a decree in the future
rather than to punishing for what had already been done where there
were no circumstances showing a threat to continue.
When a nuisance exists over which a particular court has juris-
diction (the Eighteenth Amendment gave the Federal government
jurisdiction and Congress thereunder made a certain act a nuisance
and placed the jurisdiction in the District courts), that court may
enjoin it and then enforce its decree. 16 Congress, in section 22,
clearly declared that the court should enjoin, not only the nuisance
but, sales of liquor. A sale was enjoined, and if this injunction was
valid and was violated there was a contempt. Thus it is questioned:
can equity enjoin a single act, or when so enjoined, will the commis-
sion of a single act violate the injunction; or, can a court of equity
punish a contempt which consists in a single act where no circum-
stances constitute a threat to repeat the act? It would seem more
logical, although it would produce no different result than the court
reached, to say that Congress intended for the court to enjoin the
single act, but that although they did it, after a single act is enjoined
a punishment could not be inflicted by a court of equity for a single
past violation. It would be a useless act for the court to make a
decree that it did not have the power to enforce, and therefore the
" U. S. Comp. Stat. (1925) sec. 10138y 2k; Kling v. U. S. (1925) 8 F. (2nd)730.
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prevailing opinion reached the correct conclusion, that Congress never
intended for the court to enjoin the single sale.
Because the court gave as its reason for its construction of the
statute the possible unconstitutionality of the act unless so construed,
we believe the court thought that the act, if construed as contended
by the dissenting opinion, would deprive a defendant of a jury trial
in a criminal case. Such a construction would confer upon a court
of equity complete jurisdiction over the crime of selling liquor.
This statement should not be confused with the oft-stated but
erroneous idea that equity will not enjoin a crime. The fact that
selling liquor is a crime is immaterial so long as equity has jurisdiction
for some other reason, such as the existence of a nuisance.
The case of Mugler v. Kansas does not settle the question that
equity can punish a single past sale without a jury trial, as is some-
times supposed. A comparison of the Mugler case with what is
said in Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co. serves to illustrate the
distinction between the instant case and the Mugler case. The
distinction between a civil and a criminal contempt has arisen in
various forms often to determine whether an appeal or a writ of
error would lie to review the case, as in Bessetti v. W. B. Conkey
Co.,17where contempt was treated as criminal in determining the
method of review; or it was held a criminal case for the purpose of
determining whether one could be compelled to give evidence against
himself.1 8 But where coercive relief was an object, a contempt was
held not to be a criminal case in determining whether it was review-
able by the Supreme Court of the United States ;19 and in the Gonp-
pers case, supra, in determining whether a bill of exceptions was
necessary to the contempt proceeding, it was held to be criminal, and
review was refused because no bill of exceptions was made as required
in criminal cases; and in determining whether a trial shall be had
under Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution, contempt was held not
to be a criminal proceeding. 20  And in a recent West Virginia case
proof was required beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal cases,
but the court held defendant not entitled to trial by jury ;21 but the
object was "to punish the defendant therein as a preventive measure
to stop future instigations.
2 2
" Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 421.
'Boyd v. U. S. (1866) 116 U. S. 616.
" Worden v. Searls (1887) 121 U. S. 14.
" Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama (1888) 128 U. S. 96.
'State v. Bittner (1926) 136 S. E. 202.
" See also U. S. v. Jose (1894) 63 Fed. 951.
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Regardless of whether a contempt is civil or criminal for other
procedural purposes, it is definitely settled that for the purpose of
determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for the
violation of an order of a court of equity, it is civil in the sense that
neither state nor federal constitutions guarantee him a jury trial.
28
But in such cases there were acts which constituted a threat to repeat
or continue the violation. In Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County
24 it
was said that one of the attributes incident to a court of justice was
that it should have the power of vindicating its dignity . . . with-
out calling upon a jury to assist in the exercise of this power, 25 and
this has been taken as settling the question as to jury trials in equity
contempt cases.
In some states, even where a state constitution provides that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury,2 6 the courts have held that a
defendant charged with liquor contempt is not entitled to a jury
trial.27 But previous cases, both state and federal, can harly be con-
"Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623; Lewhisholn v. U. S. (1922)
278 Fed. 421.
' Eitenbecker v. Plymouth County (1890) 134 U. S. 31.
"In Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510, this court speaks in the fol-
lowing language:
"'The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts. Its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and the en-
forcement of the judgements, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United
States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any sub-
ject, they became possessed of this power. But the power has been limited
and defined by the act of Congress of March 2nd, 1921. 4 Stat. 487. . .
"It will thus be seen that even in the act of Congress, intended to limit the
power of the courts to punish for contempts of its authority by summary
proceedings, there is expressly left the power to punish in this summary
manner the disobedience of any party, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree or command of said court. This statute was only designed for the
government of the courts of the United States, and the opinions of this
court in the cases we 'have already referred to show conclusively what was
the nature and extent of the power inherent in the court of the states by
virtue of their organization, and that the punishments which they were author-
ized to inflict for a disobedience to their writs and orders were ample and
summary, and did not require the interposition of a jury to find the facts
or assess the punishment. This, then, is due process of law in regard to
contempts of courts; was" due process of law at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal Constitution was adopted; and nothing has ever
changed it except such statutes as Congress may have enacted for the courts
of the United States, and as each State may have enacted for the government
of its own courts." Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County (1890) 134 U. S. 31,
37 and 38.
'Art. 1, sec. 10, Iowa Constitution.
'Mandercheid v. Dist. Court of Plymouth County (1886) 69 Iowa 240,
28 N. W. 551.
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sidered, in view of the way they were presented. Defendants have
assumed that because selling liquor was a crime as well as a contempt
of court, that a court of equity could not try them, and the previous
decisions generally settled the proposition that equity will not enjoin
an act merely because it is a crime, but that regardless of whether it
is a crime or not, if the act is a nuisance equity has jurisdiction to
enjoin the nuisance, and, having done so, to enforce its decree even to
the extent of imprisonment for contempt.
The departure, however, of the instant case from the above state-
ment might be justified because of the fact that the court did not
enjoin the nuisance, but a single act which, not being nuisancesome
was (and there being no other pretended ground of equity jurisdic-
tion) (1) beyond equity jurisdiction, (2) beyond the relief reqtiired,
or (3) beyond the right of the court-to enforce. Because of this
difference of fact, this case did not fall within the rule of the Mugler
case and that long line of authorities, both state and federal, that hold
with it. It seems that the reason for the court's conclusion was the
question of the right of the court to enforce the order.
While the Gompers case, supra, did not involve the question of a
jury trial, what the court said therein, if applied to a single sale of
liquor, would reconcile the present case with previous authorities. In
the Gompers case the court said:
"Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And
'it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to
either one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics
of both.' But in either event, and whether the proceedings be civil
or criminal, there must be an allegation that in contempt of court the
defendant has disobeyed the order, and a prayer that he be attached
and punished therefor. It is not the fact of punishment, but rather
its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between
the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment
is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for
criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority
of the court. It is true that punishment by imprisonment may be
remedial as well as punitive, and many civil contempt proceedings
have resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable to the com-
plainant, but also in committing the defendant to prison. But
imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has
refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order
which either in form or substance, was mandatory in its character.
Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is
intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had
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refused to do. The decree in such cases is that the defendant stand
committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required
by the court's order.
"For example: If a defendant should refuse to pay alimony, or
to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to
make a conveyance required by a decree for specific performance, he
could be committed until he complied with the order. Unless there
were special elements of contumacy, the refusal to pay or to comply
with the order is treated as being rather in resistance to the opposite
party than in contempt of the court. The order for imprisonment in
this class of cases, therefore, is not to vindicate the authority of the
law, but is remedial, and is intended to coerce the defendant to do the
thing required by the order for the benefit of the complainant. If
imprisoned, as aptly said, 'he carried the keys of the prison in his own
pocket.' He can end the sentence and discharge himself at any
moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.
"On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has been
commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished.
Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done, nor afford
any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the disobedi-
ence. If the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period,
the defendant is furnished no key, and he cannot shorten the term
by promising not to repeat the offense. Such imprisonment operates
not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for
the completed act of disobedience.
"The distinction between refusing to do an act commanded
(remedied by imprisonment until the party performs the required
act) and doing an act forbidden (punished by imprisonment for a
definite term) is sound in principle, and generally, if not universally,
affords a test by which to determine the character of the punishment."
Excluding acts committed in the presence of the court, contempts
might be classified as (1) coercive and summarily triable, and (2)
punitive and triable as crimes. The cases generally hold as does the
Gompers case that where there is any threat to continue the wrong
enjoined, the effort on the part of the court to try the defendant is
coercive. But where a single act is accompanied by no threat to
repeat or continue, when defendant is cited by the court his act is
past. There is no hope of coercion and the effort is to punish him.
In other words, he is accused of a crime. There being no excuse but
punishment, he is entitled to all the incidents of a criminal trial.
We do not mean to indicate that his is a crime because selling liquor
is by statute a crime, but rather he is accused of a crime because the
court is undertaking to punish him rather than to coerce him. The
crime he is being punished for is that of past disobeyance, not the
crime of selling liquor.
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The instant case should not be confused with that class of cases
which hold that single sales of liquor may be nuisances when con-
nected with other circumstances. 28 A single sale, together with other
acts, might make a nuisance of the premises. Nuisance implies the
continuation or threat to repeat a wrong. While the court used the
expression that Webb's single sale did not constitute a nuisance and
was thus not a contempt, we cannot help but feel that the court had
in mind the repetition quality and, that quality being absent, the
wrong was completed and equity had no power to punish for a past
act. The way the injunction was worded there was a contempt, as
pointed out by the dissenting opinion. But being past, and there
being no threat to continue it, it was a kind of contempt equity had
no power to try.
It may be difficult under given circumstances to determine whether
or not the act is a complete one, and for all practical purposes there
are but two situations where the distinction between a complete and
a continuing act would be of importance. It is possible that a court
of equity in the proper case, in order to maintain its own jurisdiction,
would interpret a single sale as being a threat to continue. And if
it did so, summary punishment would be permissible. In many cases
the same problem would arise as occurred in the case of The Mil-
waukee Social Democrat Publishing Co. v. Burleson.29 The Post-
master General had deprived Congressman Berger's Milwaukee
Leader of the second-class mail privileges upon the charge that arti-
cles were constantly appearing in the paper which violated the
Espionage Act. Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented, principally
on the ground that there was no authorization to deny second-class
privileges because previous issues contained non-mailable matter.
The opinion of the court was based, however, upon the theory that
the Postmaster General was justified in assuming that when a paper
has contained non-mailable matter for a considerable time it is reason-
able to conclude that it will continue to do so. Thus when a defend-
ant has been ordered not to sell liquor, a single sale violates that order.
But it does not necessarily indicate an intention to continue to violate
it, but it might under some circumstances do so. So we think the
dissenting opinion in the principal case is right in that Webb was in
contempt of court, but there being no circumstances threatening to
' Shechter v. U. S. (1925) 7 F. (2nd) 881; Herinansky v. U. S. (1925) 7. F.
(2nd) 458; Barker v. U. S. (1923) 289 F. 249.
' Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson (1920) 255 U. S. 407.
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continue, any action on the part of the court for the past acts would
have been criminal prosecution rather than a summary proceeding.
Under evidence conducing to proving divers sales the court would be
justified in finding the ultimate fact of a threat to continue, but it
seems that under an accusation stating only past acts without stating
a threat to continue the defendant should not be tried summarily.
In other words, the distinction is only important in that the con-
tempt proceeding must accuse the defendant of threats to continue
to violate the injunction, and there must be evidence enough to
justify a finding of intention to continue. A single sale without more
would hardly justify such a finding of fact. It is the distinction
between an ultimate and an evidentiary fact. The ultimate fact that
must be alleged in the accusation (usually a statutory information, or
an order to show cause) is an act of violation continuing or repeated.
It is this ultimate fact that makes it possible for equity to "coerce"
as contempt. It must be alleged and proved. A single sale might,
under proper circumstances, be sufficient evidence to prove the ulti-
mate fact, and under other circumstances it might not. The instant
case is one where it was not.
There are then two important requisites to a summary trial:
(1) Allegation of continuance of disobedience with act in furtherance
thereof, and (2) evidence to support a finding of intent to repeat
or continue the disobedience. A single act may be sufficient as such
evidence, or it may not; but certainly where one is accused in the
information of merely a single act there is no basis for a summary
trial.
